Abstract: This report questions mainstream approaches to the reintegration of youthful ex-combatants. In Liberia, the disarmament and demobilisation was implemented quite effectively, but several questions can be asked about the components of reintegration and rehabilitation in the DDR-process. Most ex-combatants are currently unemployed or underemployed as the programmes initiated first and foremost prepared them for jobs that did not exist. The programmes also worked from the assumption that wartime experiences, networks and command structures had to be broken down as they were seen as counterproductive to peace and reconciliation. Drawing on previous research in Liberia the hypothesis is that reintegration can better be achieved through peaceful remobilisation that allows the ex-combatants to make use of the skills, experiences and networks gained through the war. This is illustrated by the recent experience of a nightwatch patrol in Voinjama in Lofa County that was based on rank and command structure from the war which responded to local community demands and filled a security vacuum. This is an alternative path to reintegration that needs further analysis, and the article argued that this should be based on the premises of a genuine understanding of the background of Liberia's young ex-combatants and the nature and form of their involvement in violent conflict. Many people were involved in the war, but most only fought for certain periods. The motivations for joining varied, but the collected data from our various studies shows that security considerations were among the most important factors. Most combatants were ordinary people who joined for the sake of protection for themselves, their families and their communities. DDR in Liberia, as elsewhere, is, however, built on the assumption that there is something particularly dangerous and marginalised about the group of people who constituted the rank-and-file of the factions involved in the war. This is, as we have seen, not necessarily the case. DDR is very much a reaction to the notion that these people are unattached to society, set apart in their own world, and therefore needs particular attention. The article will therefore suggests that DDR approaches are in dire need of a rethinking that links them more directly to programmes aimed at social cohesion and societal security.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Liberian civil war almost 100,000 former combatants were demobilised through the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme (LDDRRP). This programme is hailed as a success both by the United Nations' Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and other international stakeholders.
However, whereas disarmament and demobilisation was implemented quite effectively, several questions can be asked about the components of reintegration and rehabilitation.
Most ex-combatants are unemployed or underemployed as the programmes initiated not only prepared them for jobs that did not exist, but also worked from the assumption that wartime experiences, networks and command structures had to be broken down as they were seen as counterproductive to peace and reconciliation. This is, however, not necessarily the case. Drawing on previous and ongoing research in Liberia, the aim of this report is to question mainstream approaches to the reintegration of youthful ex-combatants, asking whether this may be better achieved through peaceful remobilisation allowing ex-combatants to make use of the skills, experiences and networks gained during the war. This can, however, only be probed through a genuine understanding of the background of Liberia's young ex-combatants, and the nature and form of their involvement in violent conflict. Many people were involved in the war, but most only fought for certain periods and whereas the motivations for joining armed groups were many, systematic research on ex-combatants reveal that security considerations were among the most important factors. Most combatants were ordinary Liberians who joined for the sake of protection for themselves, their families and their communities (see Bøås and Hatløy 2008 3 The two studies will be referred to as the 'Monrovia' data set and the 'Voinjama' data set in this report.
The method for data collection consisted of a combination of RespondentDriven Sampling (RDS) and in-depth qualitative interviewing. RDS is a type of chain referral sampling that has been developed to identify hidden and elusive populations, but the method is also suitable for populations were no sampling frame exists (Heckathorn 1997) . This is the case for ex-combatants in Liberia. The Monrovia and the Voinjama samples consist of respectively 491 and 275 ex-combatants.
Understanding Liberian ex-combatants
The ordinary Liberian ex-combatants are usually seen as young person with a history of unemployment, underemployment and idleness (Dufka 2005; UN 2004; UNOWA 2005) , often based on a background as uprooted urban youths (Mkandawire 2002) or lumpen youths, prone to criminal behaviour and gross indiscipline (Abdullah 1998) .
The assumption behind the DDR-programme in Liberia was therefore that there is something particularly marginalised and violent about the pre-war lives of the young people who constituted the rank and file of the armed factions. The data collected in Monrovia, however, offered a different picture (see Bøås and Hatløy 2008) and the findings from the study in Voinjama supported this: the ex-combatants does not seem to have been any more idle, marginalised and alienated than any other group of young men in Liberia. Before they joined the insurgency they were never a world a part from their parents, relatives and local communities, but the majority were in fact living with them.
Thus, suggesting that whereas one of the main objectives of DDR is to help reduce stigmatisation by means of programmes and processes to reintegrate former fighters, the programmes in Liberia may have had the opposite effect; by taking a group that was not particularly stigmatised and set them apart as an easily identifiable stereotyped group, marking them as something 'other' and problematic (see Jennings 2007) .
Some reported that they were forced to join an armed group, but the findings in table 5 and 6 describes that, for the majority this was not the case. They made their decision based on the security predicament that they believed that they and their families were facing. Thus, suggesting that DDR approaches are in dire need of a rethinking that links them more directly to programmes aimed at social cohesion and societal security. Objectives more likely to be reached this report argues, if stakeholders work with rather than against the skills, networks and even the command structures acquired and established during the war. The road to reintegration and enhanced social cohesion and societal security can be better achieved through peaceful remobilisation of command structure than through first signposting a certain group (young rank and file ex-combatants) as particularly problematic for peace and stability and reconstituting their position as marginal by actively attempting to 'destroy' the skills and other sources of empowerment that may have gained during the war. The irony is thus that current approaches to DDR may leave ex-combatants in a more vulnerable position of marginality when the end of the war is 'written' by those supervising the transition from war to peace that the DDR programmes should represents.
Before we turn to a discussion of our data, some brief clarification of mayor assumptions and concepts are necessary. First, an important assumption in the report is that, in societies undergoing conflict, armed groups can provide some sort of order and social organisation, and represent means for social integration and upward social mobility (see Utas 2003) . In short, violence represents empowerment as well suffering and destruction. Although it is true that most of the combatants were poor and did not have a wide variety of options available, this is only an observation, not an explanation.
It does not account for why many similarly situated young people did not join.
Moreover, we argue that, just because people make choices under some level of coercion -not an uncommon occurrence in any society -this does not remove their agency and their ability to evaluate and act upon alternative coping strategies. The report is therefore built on the premise that people have agency, and they are not merely victims of circumstances and structures that they do not understand. It does not mean that they have an unlimited range of options they can choose from, but they are capable of acting within certain constraints and seize opportunities that are available to them. In this regard, the report is supported by Honwana's (2005 Honwana's ( , 2006 distinction between 'tactical' and 'strategic' agency. The first is narrow and opportunistic, 'exercised to cope with concrete, immediate concerns of their lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their violent military environment' (Honwana 2006: 71) . The latter is based on a position of power that enables a certain degree of control over the self and the decisions taken. It is an agency of a longer timeframe, where events and action can be planned and are not only 'determined by random factors they could neither predict or control' (ibid.).
Carefully examining the conditions and concerns that initially led some people to join militias and participate in armed conflict, rather than simply assuming that force, poverty, greed, grievances were the only factors that were determinative, illuminate the distinction between tactical and strategic agency. By joining one or several armed groups, many ex-combatants seem to have made tactical decisions rooted in security concerns, and years after the conflicted ended their existence in post-war Liberia is to a large extent still tactical -opportunistic and oriented towards surviving, not thriving.
Characteristics of the Liberian ex-combatant
As Table 1 and Table 2 The excombatants is a young population even if there is at least six years since they were demobilised. In Monrovia, 64 percent of the combatants are less than 26 years of age, and only nine percent are above 34 years of age. The former combatants in Voinjama are also quite young, 58 percent were below the age of 26, and 25 percent below the age of 31.
As shown in table 1, one-third of the ex-combatants interviewed in Monrovia were born in Montserrado, whereas the ex-combatants born outside of Greater Monrovia mainly originates from the counties of Lofa (15 percent), Nimba 13 percent)
and Bong 11 (Percent). In the Voinjama (see table 2), 82 percent were born and belonged to Lofa. Almost none of the ex-combatants in the two data sets were of foreign origin. This is quite surprisingly as it contradicts several reports from international NGOs who argues that there is a West African community of regional rebels who cross borders both to take part in wars and to benefit from DDRprogrammes (see Dufka 2005) . The difference between the findings in this study and the reports from NGOs could be explained by two factors. Either they have already moved elsewhere, or this group of foreign ex combatants is much smaller than previous 6 research has indicated. We cannot completely rule out the possibility that they have moved elsewhere or returned to their home of origin, but even in Lofa where many claimed that Guineans of Koninake origin fought for their ethnic cousins the Mandingo in LURD, most of the ex-combatants (of Mandingo as well as Loma origin) claimed that they were quite few and that their number had been increased by Taylor propaganda. The Liberian war was a national conflict and not a war of regional mercenaries. 
Participation in the civil war
As shown below in Table 3 and Table 4 , the majority of the ex-combatants had either fought for LURD or Taylor's forces -the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or other smaller militias allied to Taylor. Most of the ex-combatants at Duala Market had fought for LURD, whereas those in Red Light were mainly involved in Taylor's forces.
In Voinjama, however, the overall majority had fought for LURD, and the remaining minority for Taylor allies. For the observant reader, the ethnic composition of the ex-combatants from Duala
Market with regard to their faction affiliation may seem surprising: LURD was mainly a
Mandingo project, but many of the ex-combatants from the LURD-affiliated Duala
Marked are of Kru origin (see Table 1 were asked about what they thought about their 'brothers in arms' who were still 'hanging around' in Monrovia. Almost exclusively, they replied that these men were not true Mandingo warriors who had fought for a cause, but rather 'hoodlums' and 'nobodies' who had been recruited because they were needed as manpower for the final offensive on Monrovia.
It is not only of interest to know whom excombatants initially fought for, but also whether they changed sides during the cause of war. Surprisingly few combatants fought for more than one group. In Monrovia only nine percent fought with two groups, and less than one percent with three groups. Among the 47 persons who reported that they moved from one group to another 27 moved from NPFL to LURD and other factions; while eight moved from LURD to other factions. In Voinjama almost no such movement between factions are recorded. This implies that is that much fewer combatants have switched between the armed factions than suggested by other reports (see Dufka 2005) . Our data indicates that the young combatants who see war as an occupation -and therefore changed 'employer' when new economic opportunities (of looting and plundering) emerge -are relatively few. The 'mercenary warrior' problem argued by Human Rights Watch and other NGOs may exist, but this group seems to be smaller than envisioned. That said, the data also indicates (for example in a transfer from NPFL to LURD) that some people fought for a while, then returned to other, more peaceful activities, before yet again taking up arms. 4 This is in line with Ellis who observes that 'there appears to have been a large number of people who took up arms at some stage of the war, but may have been victims at order times [...] . Even hard-core fighters seem to have remained attached to wider social communities '(1999: 133) .
Who they are
As already stated, the majority of the ex-combatants claim that their main reasons for joining the insurgencies were security related: for their own protection and security, as well their families. Each respondent could give three main reasons
As Table 5 shows, security was the most important reason for joining among the population from Monrovia. This seems to be regardless of what armed faction they belonged to. However, as is also evident, the security motivation is somewhat stronger for those that joined NPFL that for those with LURD. This could be due the number of combatants who were involved with LURD for a short time during that insurgency's final offensive towards Monrovia in 2003. In addition to protect themselves, it is likely that many also joined for other and more opportunistic reasons, among others to make some money and obtain some goods. The reasons for getting involved in Voinjama are similar to the answers reported in Monrovia. Table 6 shows that joining an insurgency due to security-related factors was a strong motivation factor among the ex-combatants. In both data sets, 32 percent reported that they had been kidnapped or forced. Abductions and forced recruitment were practised by all armed factions during the civil war in Liberia, but contrary to some NGO reporting, a high number of combatants also recruited themselves voluntarily into thearmed group. It is every reason to believe that the figures reported here are more accurate than claims, often based on assumptions, that almost all fighters were forcibly recruited. The majority of ex-combatants were ordinary people who joined armed groups based on various reasons concerning protection and opportunity.
Their 'ordinariness' of the ex-combatants is also illustrated by whom they lived with prior to the war. These ex-combatants were never the 'loose molecules' of society:
a hyper-mobile community of 'lumpens' hardwired to criminality and idleness, but a group of ordinary Liberian youth who mainly lived and lives with parents or close relatives. The majority of the former combatants in Monrovia and Voinjama had been enrolled in school and conducted some work (see table 7 , 8, 9 and 10). It was only the minority who were unemployed in search for work. Before they joined an armed group, the majority of the ex-combatants in Monrovia went to school (60 percent) and almost 25 percent were working. Often idleness has been claimed as one of the main reasons for young people to join armed groups (see UN 2004). However, most of the ex-combatants hanging around in Red Light and Duala
Market had something to do before they joined an armed group. The same results are also evident in the data from Voinjama. Table 9 . Duties and whom they were living with before joining an armed group, in percent (Voinjama) All Duties six months before joining the first armed group Work 17
School 63
Housework 13
Nothing 6
Other 4
Lived with before they joined the first armed group Parents/ Close relatives 84
Alone 8 With spouse/children 5 Friends 3 N 275 Table 10 . Living with after participated in armed group, in percent* (Voinjama)
Spouse/own children 25
Parents or other relatives 52
Friends/ex-combatants 25 N 275 *multiple responses possible, total percentages may exceed 100 percent They went to school (63 percent) or worked (17 percent), and very few, only six percent, claimed that they had nothing to do, The majority lived with parents or other close relatives. After the war, the majority either settled down with their spouse and children or continued to live with their families. There is a subsection of 25 percent who now live together with friends made during the war, however none reported to live alone contrary to eight percent prior to their engagement in the civil war. To share a house with some friends was a much more affordable solution and some of the former combatants reported that they preferred to share a house/room with friends they trusted.
The most important thing to take note of, however, is that there is little in these background variables that indicate that our informants were more marginalised than most other young people in Liberia. They went to school, worked and lived with either their parents or other close relatives. The ex-combatants background is therefore remarkably normal. It is, however, also important to keep in mind that pre-war Liberia was a country where exclusion and marginalisation were the normal conditions for most people. Most people were generally poor, disenfranchised, and without any access to or hope for upward social mobility (see Ellis 1999). The civil war that started on Christmas Eve 1989 did not improve people's living condition. For the majority, it only made them worse and less predictable.
There is also nothing in the datasets that indicates that they are ex- Nevertheless, the DDR interventions has almost exclusively been based on the assumption that wartime experiences networks and command structures must be broken down as they would be counterproductive to peace and reconciliation. This is, as the following small case study from Voinjama illustrates not necessarily the case.
Reintegration through remobilisation: the night watch in Voinjama
After the end of the war and the termination of the DDR-programme, the ex-combatants in Voinjama (as elsewhere in Liberia) returned to the same life as the one they had lived prior to the war: a life of poverty, marginalisation and few if any potential for upward social mobility (for example 44 percent of the informants in Monrovia are unemployed; that is, with one exception: they were not ordinary Liberian youths anymore as they had assumed the status of ex-combatants. The job training and skills training that the DDRprogramme had given them were of little use in their quest for employment, and their wartime experience was only defined in negative terms. This was also the case in Voinjama where many ex-combatants claimed that they felt useless and seen as 'disposable youths' by UN and other humanitarian actors that arrived in the area after the war ended. They ended up precisely as poor as they were when the war started, the only difference was that they after the war also were singled out as a security threat, making their aspirations of work, progress and upward social mobility even harder to achieve. This was their life-world situation in Voinjama until new local security dynamics lead to a demand for the skills, networks and command structures that the excombatants acquired during the war. and resources, but was also seen as corrupt, and a local judiciary system did not exist. In addition, rumours also started circulating that 'Hardman', a notorious expert in ritual killings were about to relocate from Gbargna to Voinjama and make this area the centre of his operations.
5 Thus, feeling increasingly under threat, local people and the business community, Loma and Mandingo alike turned to the only people they believed could provide security, the faction leaders from the war that still had command structure authority.
The one they turned to was 'Master General', a quite respected, but also much feared LURD leader during the war. Master General quickly seized the initiative and reactivated his command structures from the war (e.g. LURD), but also included some of his former enemies; that is people who had fought for Taylor or local Taylor-allied Loma militias. The product was an effective neighbourhood militia that acted as a night watch patrolling the streets of Voinjama every night from midnight to five am in the morning established. Master General was the 'commander', but the nigh watch was also given a civilian superstructure in the form of a committee consisting of a chairman (a Mandingo youth leader), a co-chairman (a rich Loma farmer) and a secretary (an educated Mandingo youth leader). This committee kept records of suspected criminals apprehended, before they were either handed over to the police or just chased out of the town and the area, and administered the revenue collection needed to maintain the night watch. Each household contributed 20 Liberian dollars per week, whereas shop owners paid 50 Liberian dollars per week for each shop or market stall that they owned.
In the months that this 'experiment' in local security provision lasted (basically to the end of 2008) crime dropped remarkably. The ex-combatants not only felt useful, but also were seen as valuable community members and not a latent security threat, and earned some money as well. Thus, what this case suggest is not only that peaceful remobilisation such as this through latent command structures can facilitate reintegration, but also create even state-like security systems that can fill a void that the Liberian state and its international partners had ignored. The night watch not only provided security, it also administered justice and collected revenue to maintain this system in a legitimate manner. When the system was dismantled it was simply because it was not seen as needed anymore, but the committee continues to meet to screen the security situation and discussions concerning the permanent re-establishment of the night watch continues. All of this happened and continues to happen without much involvement of the Liberian state and the UN and other international agencies, suggesting that the latter seem to stick to the assumption that the ex-combatants constitutes a particular difficult and dangerous segment of the Liberian population. The local community, however, saw them as what they really are ordinary youths who ended up fighting due to the specific circumstances of the Liberian civil war.
Some concluding thoughts
The DDR program in Liberia, as elsewhere, is built on the assumption that there is something particularly dangerous and marginalised about the group of people who constituted the rank-and-file of the factions involved in the war. This is, as we have seen, not necessarily the case. DDR is very much a reaction to the notion that these people are unattached to society, set apart in their own world, and therefore needs particular attention. This is not the case in Liberia, and the DDR-programme may therefore have had the opposite effect.
This suggests that DDR approaches are in dire need of a rethinking that links them more directly to programmes aimed at social cohesion and societal security. In this regard, DDR can still play an important role as an official signpost for general demobilisation and disarmament, the first step towards an improved security situation, and a change from 'tactical' to 'strategic' agency. This has, however, not been the case of DDR in Liberia. Rather as the case study from Voinjama showed, a movement from the 'tactical' to the 'strategic' aspect of agency only started when peaceful remobilisation occurred to serve a local demand for security. Re-examining security considerations can therefore help us understand these challenges, as well as illustrating the importance of basing post-conflict programmes such as DDR on knowledge derived from and specific to the local context.
